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REIMERDES, CHAMBERLAIN, AND REALDVD:




On August 11, 2009, federal Judge Marilyn Hall Patel of the
Northern District of California issued a memorandum and order pre-
liminarily enjoining RealNetworks, Inc. ("Real") from manufacturing,
trafficking, and distributing RealDVD, 1 a product that allows users to
"rip" digital versatile discs (DVDs) to the hard drives of computers. 2
Although RealDVD provides users with a variety of functions-for
instance, supplying information about a DVD's content, making avail-
able links to relevant websites, and providing protection from scratch-
ing-its principal and controversial function is to save the content of a
DVD to the hard drive of a computer. This, according to Real, allows
consumers to backup their personal property.3 The product provides
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., History,
Boston College, 2005.
1 Internally, the product was referred to as Vegas. "The name Vegas was chosen
for the software product because, according to Real's Senior Vice President Phillip
Barrett, 'What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas.'" RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy
Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Barrett Deposition
at 64:25, RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (Nos. C-08-04548 MHP, 08-04719 MHP)).
Real also developed a new product known as "New Platform" or "Facet." Id. at 925.
Facet was designed to be an improved "next generation" DVD player that would allow
consumers to archive, organize, and play movies "without the need to keep track of
physical DVDs." Id. Facet and Vegas were designed to run on different operating
systems; however, the software functions essentially the same way on both systems and
Facet and Vegas are both referred to as RealDVD. Id. at 926.
2 See id. at 924-25. To "rip" a DVD is to decrypt the numerous security systems
that protect certain uses of its content, such as preventing users from playing back the
content on noncompliant computers or copying content to computer hard drives. See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
3 RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 925. In addition, RealDVD allows users to copy
DVDs to laptop computers or portable hard drives. Id.
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a limit of five software licenses, so users can play back copies of their
DVDs on up to five computers on which RealDVD has been
downloaded and registered to the individual's user account and
license key.4 Although Real markets its product solely for use with
DVDs that a consumer owns, warning its potential users that the prod-
uct is legal only if you are the owner of the to-be copied DVD, the
product itself does not limit the number of times a physical DVD can
be copied and allows a user to copy DVDs not owned by its user. 5
RealDVD works by decrypting the technological security mea-
sures that are placed on a DVD by those who own the copyright to its
content.6 The principal security measure, Content Scramble System
(CSS) technology, "is an encryption-based system that requires the use
of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a com-
puter DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy,
motion pictures on DVDs." 7 This encryption-based system employs an
algorithm configured by a set of security keys that transforms a DVD's
content into "gibberish." Only those devices that contain "player
keys" and the CSS encryption algorithm can access the DVD's con-
tents.9 Hollywood smartly released its copyrighted content in digital
form only after it had developed these security measures, which
allowed it to successfully combat piracy. 10 Hollywood now controls
the use of a DVD's content, and so it licenses decryption information
for an annual fee to those DVD player manufacturers that have an
interest in having their DVD players work.1
But Hollywood does not give away the keys to its castle: "The CSS
technology creates a system whereby a movie . . . may only be played
back in decrypted and unscrambled form from the physical DVD and
not any other source, such as a computer hard drive. This same sys-
tem ensures that 'playable,' i.e., decrypted and descrambled, copies
4 Id.
5 Id. at 926.
6 See id. at 933. The copyright owners of the DVD's content are, in most
instances and in this lawsuit, the motion picture studios (the "Studios"), referred to
generally as "Hollywood."
7 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (emphasis added).
8 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).
9 Id. at 437.
10 Id.
11 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308 ("The technology necessary to configure
DVD players and drives to play CSS-protected DVDs has been licensed to hundreds of
manufacturers in the United States and around the world."); Content Scramble System
(CSS), DVD CoPY CONTROL Ass'N, http://www.dvdcca.org/css.aspx (last visited Feb. 5,
2011) (detailing the schedule of licensing fees, the fee for the Functional Member-
ship license category being $15,500 per year).
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... cannot be made."12 Furthermore, the terms of the license include
a confidentiality agreement that keeps "player keys" and other data
secret.13 With this technology in hand, the Studios began releasing
movies on DVD in 1997.14 The format quickly became popular, creat-
ing a significant source of revenue.1 5
In deciding whether to enjoin Real from taking its product to the
market, Judge Patel faced two overarching issues: (1) whether Real's
conduct violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)' 6 and
(2) whether Real had breached its license agreement with the DVD
Copy Control Association. 17 The latter issue concerned the CSS
License Agreement signed by the parties, an agreement which made
Real a licensee of CSS technology, giving to Real the information it
needed to develop RealDVD. The former issue concerned a law-the
DMCA-whose interpretation is currently in controversy and is the
subject of this Note.18 From Judge Patel's order and memorandum
enjoining Real, an issue emerges, which can only be understood after
an explication of the DMCA. Thus, Part I lays out the relevant provi-
sions of the DMCA, followed by Part II, which presents the issue of this
Note-an issue faced, considered, and ruled on by Judge Patel. Part
III then describes two conflicting interpretations of the DMCA, fol-
lowed by Part IV, which describes the regime in place before the
DMCA was enacted. All of this background sheds light on Part V-a
brief comment on Judge Patel's ruling and opinion. 19
12 RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (citation omitted).
13 Corey, 273 F.3d at 437.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
17 RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
18 Counsel for both parties presented many arguments based on the DMCA to
Judge Patel. For purposes of brevity, only those particular arguments and issues that
are relevant to this analysis will be discussed.
19 On March 3, 2010, Real announced that it had settled these lawsuits with
Hollywood. Real withdrew its appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction and
permanently removed its product from the market. In addition, Real agreed to pay
the studios $4.5 million for the costs and fees incurred in the litigation. Bob Kimball,
president and acting CEO for Real, put the matter behind his company: "Until this
dispute, Real had always enjoyed a productive working relationship with Hollywood.
With this litigation resolved, I hope that in the future we can find mutually beneficial
ways to use Real technology to bring Hollywood's great work to consumers."
RealNetworks Settles RealDVD Dispute with Hollywood, REAL (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.
realnetworks.com/pressroom/releases/2010/corp-realdvd.aspx.
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I. THE DMCA
Signed into law by President Clinton in 1998, the DMCA imple-
mented two 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaties while addressing other significant copyright-related issues in
an attempt to bring U.S. copyright law "squarely into the digital
age."20 The legislation is divided into five titles, covering a range of
topics from limiting the liability of online service providers for online
copyright infringement to creating a new form of intellectual property
protection for the design of vessel hulls.2 1 In the debate leading up to
the passage of the bill, most relevant were the three provisions
targeted at the circumvention of technological protection measures. 22
"[A] critical focus of Congressional consideration of the legislation
was the conflict between those who opposed anti-circumvention mea-
sures as inappropriate extensions of copyright and impediments to
fair use and those who supported them as essential to proper protec-
tion of copyrighted materials in the digital age."23 As with almost any
bill, compromise and balance paved the way for its passing the bicam-
eral and presentment requirements of the Constitution and becoming
law. 24 The compromise-between those who opposed anticircumven-
tion measures as extending copyright and impeding fair use and those
who supported the measures as proper protection-found its expres-
sion in the three "anticircumvention" provisions of § 1201 (a) (1),
§ 1201(a) (2), and § 1201(b) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. 25
Section 1201(a) (1) (A) provides in part that "[n]o person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title."26 Section 1201(a)(2), more com-
plex, provides that
20 See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL Mi-
LENNIUM COPYRIGHT Acr OF 1998, at 1 (1998) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE
SUMMARY].
21 See COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 1.
22 See Corey, 273 F.3d at 440; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
23 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
24 See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(explaining how Congress sought to prohibit circumvention of protective technolo-
gies while at the same time preserving the public's rights of fair use); Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 322 ("Congress was well aware during the consideration of the DMCA of
the traditional role of the fair use defense ... . [and it struck a balance among the
competing interests.").
25 Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
26 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) (2006) (emphasis added).
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[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, com-
ponent, or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circum-
venting a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this tide; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with
that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work pro-
tected under this tide.
2 7
And lastly, § 1201 (b) (1), mirroring § 1201 (a) (2), provides that:
[no person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, com-
ponent, or part thereof, that-
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circum-
venting protection afforded by a technological measure that effec-
tively protects a right of a copyright owner under this tide in a work or
a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this tide in a
work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with
that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively pro-
tects a right of a copyright owner under this tide in a work or a portion
thereof.2
8
Thus, § 1201 concerns two different categories of "anti-circum-
vention" prohibitions: those dealing with unauthorized access and
those dealing with unauthorized copying2 9 The "true" anticircumven-
tion provision of § 1201 (a) (1) prohibits the act of circumventing a
27 Id. § 12011(a) (2) (emphasis added).
28 Id. § 1201(b) (1) (emphasis added).
29 See COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 3-4. The term "copying" is
used by the Copyright Office "as a short-hand for the exercise of any of the exclusive
rights of an author under section 106 of the Copyright Act." Id. at 4 n.2. For
instance, a technological measure that "prevents unauthorized distribution or public
performance of a work would fall in this... category." Id.
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technological measure protecting access,30 whereas the anticircum-
vention provisions of § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b) prohibit trafficking
in devices that are used to circumvent a technological measure that
either protects access or protects a right of a copyright owner. 31
Because of this distinction-between 1201(a)(1)'s prohibition of an
act of circumvention and § 1201(a)(2)'s and § 1201(b)'s prohibition
of trafficking in devices-the latter sections will be referred to as the
"antitrafficking" provisions of the DMCA, although all three provi-
sions are commonly referred to as simply "anticircumvention"
provisions.
Noticeably missing from these provisions is a fourth prohibition
against the act of circumventing a technological measure that protects
a right of a copyright owner. Congress intentionally excluded this prohi-
bition in order to "assure that the public will have the continued abil-
ity to make fair use of copyrighted works."32 The DMCA does not
prohibit the act of circumventing a technological measure designed to
prevent copying because the public may have the right to "copy" a
copyrighted work under the fair use doctrine.33 Inapposite, the act of
gaining unauthorized access to a copyrighted work is never protected
by fair use34 and, according to Congress, is "the electronic equivalent
of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book. 35
But Congress did not rely on this distinction and its legislative history
to preserve fair use rights. Instead, Congress embodied its intent in
the statute itself, more specifically in § 1201(c) (1), which provides
that: "Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations,
or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this
title."36 The varying interpretations of how § 1201 (c) (1) (and the fair
use doctrine) affect the meaning of the anticircumvention and anti-
trafficking provisions is the issue of this Note, presented in more
30 See id. at 4 ("As to the act of circumvention in itself, the provision prohibits
circumventing the first category of technological measures, but not the second.").
31 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Subsection 1201(b) (1) is similar to subsection 1201 (a) (2), except that subsection
1201 (a) (2) covers those who traffic in technology that can circumvent 'a technologi-
cal measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under' Title 17, whereas
subsection 1201(b) (1) covers those who traffic in technology that can circumvent
'protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copy-
right owner under' Title 17." (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2), (b)(1) (2000))).
32 COPYRIGHT OFICE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 4.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17 (1998).
36 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c)(1) (2006).
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detail below. But before moving on, a few more provisions of the
DMCA must be supplied.
First, "to 'circumvent a technological measure"' in regards to the
access provisions of the DMCA "means to descramble a scrambled
work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the
authority of the copyright owner."37 A "technological measure 'effec-
tively controls access to a work' if [it], in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work."38
Second, in regards to the copying provision, circumvention is
defined as "avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise
impairing a technological measure."3 9 An effective technological
measure, in turn, is defined as a measure that "in the ordinary course
of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of
a right of a copyright owner under this title."40
Lastly, the DMCA contains a number of exceptions. For our pur-
poses, it is relevant to note that § 1201 (a) (1) (B)-(E) give the Libra-
rian of Congress the power to make administrative rules exempting
"users of a work which is in a particular class of works if they are or are
likely to be adversely affected by virtue of the prohibition in making
non-infringing uses."41 Six more narrowly tailored restrictions are
then provided, which include, for example, an exemption for individ-
uals who circumvent a technological measure for the sole purpose of
achieving interoperability of computer programs through reverse
engineering.42
II. REALNETwORKS. THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE
Although the parties to RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control
Ass'n43 raised many issues in advocating for or against RealDVD's
future in the marketplace, one issue in particular was relevant to the
future of fair use and the balance of rights set forth in copyright law.
Before this issue is presented, a brief summary of the Intellectual
37 Id. § 1201(a) (3) (A) (emphasis added).
38 Id. § 1201(a) (3) (B).
39 Id. § 1201 (b) (2) (A).
40 Id. § 1201(b) (2) (B) (emphasis added).
41 COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY, supra note 20, at 5.
42 See id. at 5-6 (providing a summary of the full list of exceptions); see also Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing the
exceptions).
43 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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Property Clause of the Constitution and the doctrine of fair use is in
order.
A. The Balance at Stake
The balance of rights set forth in copyright law is mandated by
the Constitution itself, which both confers and restricts Congress's
power to protect intellectual products" by granting Congress the
power "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. '45 The rights that Congress
may confer to authors and inventors "are neither unlimited nor pri-
marily designed to provide a special private benefit. '46 In fact, the
primary and constitutional purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause
is to promote public benefit, i.e., promoting "the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. ' 47 Congress does this through a regime of quid pro
quo. The public benefits from giving creators limited rights in their
creations in two ways: First, the grant stimulates creative activity by
offering the creator an incentive to create. Second, the grant induces
the creator to release the intellectual creation to the public.48
Thus, the Constitution charges Congress with creating and
enforcing a system that best serves the public-a system which must
balance the scope of rights granted to intellectual property owners
with the benefit derived by the public from the stimulation and dis-
semination of creativity. 49 If the balance is tipped to either side, the
constitutional purpose of the Intellectual Property Clause-that of
deriving benefit to the public-will not be fulfilled. Giving authors
too great a monopoly defeats the public good in the spreading of
44 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
Brief for Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants
at 7-8, Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (No. 00-9185).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
47 See id. ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in con-
ferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors
of authors." (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948))); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 673, 680 (2000) ("All [of Congress] equally admitted that copyright's
constitutional purpose is to promote the progress of 'science,' i.e., of disseminating
knowledge.").
48 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
49 See id. ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has
been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to
their work product.").
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ideas, knowledge and commerce, whereas giving them too little does
not incentivize the creation of works, thereby defeating that same
public good.
B. Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use was solely a judicial doctrine until the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.50 The Copyright Act then codified
the doctrine in Title 17, § 107, of the U.S. Code:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for class-
room use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.5 1
Fair use allows courts to ensure that the balance of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause is maintained on a case by case basis. If a particu-
lar application of copyright law tips the balance toward a copyright
owner's monopoly (and, therefore, stifles dissemination and creativ-
ity), the doctrine of fair use may be applied to alleviate the uneven-
ness. "From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for
fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts . . "-52 Furthermore, fair use has also been applied to
reconcile copyright with the First Amendment. 53 Although a debate
exists as to whether fair use is a defense or a right, the doctrine, never-
theless, limits the rights granted to a copyright owner by allowing for
50 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994).
51 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
52 Campbell 510 U.S. at 575 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8).
53 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 560 (2004) (noting how those claiming
fair use "now are well advised to look like traditional First Amendment defendants").
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certain types of copying, free of liability for copyright infringement. 54
In this respect, fair use can be conceptualized as those rights retained
by the public and not included in the grant of rights given to a copy-
right owner. 55 The determination of whether a particular use was
"fair" is left to the judiciary, which adjudicates disputes through analy-
sis of the factors set forth by Congress in § 107 and the policies under-
lying copyright law set forth by the Framers in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution. 56
C. The RealNetworks Issue
Real put forth numerous arguments in defense of its actions-its
actions being, in general, the creation and distribution of a product
that bypasses Hollywood's technological security measures that had
prevented certain uses of DVDs. Among Real's proffered arguments
was an invocation of the doctrine of fair use. Real alleged that
Hollywood was attempting to extend the rights granted to it by copy-
right.57 Invoking § 1201 (c) of the DMCA (" [n] othing in this section
shall affect ... fair use"), Real argued that Hollywood's rights under
the anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions were "limited in
that they exclude the rights preserved to others under the doctrine of
fair use."58 Accordingly, because consumers have a right to make per-
sonal or backup copies of DVDs using RealDVD, 59 fair use serves as an
affirmative defense to § 1201 (a)-(b) of the DMCA.60
In response, Judge Patel began by noting that the DMCA super-
sedes past case law that construed the Copyright Act.61 This case law
includes Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,62 a case
which confronted the question of whether a manufacturer is indi-
rectly liable for selling products that could be used for both infringing
54 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 321 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
55 See Fair Use Frequently Asked Questions (and Answers), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/IP/eff fair use faq.php (last updated Mar. 21, 2002)
("[Flair use can be seen as a scope of positive freedom available to users of copy-
righted material.").
56 See id.
57 RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913,941 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
58 Id. (emphasis added).
59 Real relied on Sony for this proposition. For more on the Sony case, see infra
Part W.
60 RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
61 Id.
62 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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and noninfringing purposes. 63  This question is similar to that
presented in the RealDVD case-Real argues that its product is legal
because it can be used in non-infringing ways under the doctrine of
fair use, i.e., creating personal and backup copies of a DVD, organiz-
ing and archiving a DVD collection, and easily transporting a DVD
library.64 The issue is different, though, because the RealDVD case
concerns the provisions and structure of the DMCA, not the Copy-
right Act.
The DMCA "expand[ed] the existing rights of copyright owners
... by creating new grounds for liability due to circumvention of
access [and copying protection] controls." 65 This new liability, as we
saw, is expressed in §§ 1201 (a)(1), 1201(a) (2), and 1201(b). Recall
that § 1201 (a) (1) prohibits the act of circumventing a technological
measure protecting unauthorized access, and that there is no corre-
sponding prohibition on the act of circumventing a technological
measure protecting a right of the copyright owner. But the RealDVD case
concerns not the individual act of circumvention, but the manufac-
ture and distribution of products that allow a user to circumvent.
Thus, RealNetworks presents the Sony issue all over again, albeit in a
different context. Simply put, does a product fall within the DMCA's
antitrafficking provisions if that product allows for both infringing
and noninfringing uses? Real, invoking the Sony doctrine of substan-
tial noninfringing uses, claims that RealDVD is legal because it allows
users to exercise their fair use rights. But Hollywood claims that fair
use is never a defense to the liability established under the anticircum-
vention and antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA.66 It is the Sony
issue all over again, but this time, the question must be decided in
light of the DMCA.
D. The RealNetworks Opinion
Judge Patel, in answering this question, wrote an inconsistent and
contradictory opinion. She first cites Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc.67 for the proposition that the DMCA created "new
grounds for liability due to circumvention of access controls in ways
that facilitate copyright infringement and for trafficking in circumvention
63 See id. at 420.
64 RealNetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see infra Part III.B.
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devices that facilitate copyright infringement."68 She states that copy-
right owners relying on the anticircumvention provisions still remain
bound by other relevant bodies of law, including fair use.69 However,
Patel then characterizes § 1201 (c) as merely "preserv[ing] the general
fair use defense to copyright infringement." 70 She states that "[i]t
does not create new exemptions, nor does it exempt from liability circum-
vention tools otherwise deemed unlawful under sections 1201(a)(2) or
(b)(1)."71 All this last statement does is reveal the conundrum:
whether a circumvention tool is "unlawful" under the DMCA depends
upon whether, as Patel states, the circumvention "facilitate[s] copyright
infringement."72 If a user acts within his fair use rights, a copyright is
not infringed, and so the product that the user used does not facilitate
copyright infringement and, therefore, is not "unlawful." This leads
to the conclusion that if DMCA liability hinges on the facilitation of
copyright infringement, then fair use must play a role in determining
which circumvention tools are "unlawful under the DMCA."
The opinion soon deviates from this perspective. Patel makes a
distinction between § 1201 (a) (1)-which concerns the act of circum-
venting to gain access-and the antitrafficking provisions of
§ 1201 (a) (2) and (b). She states that "If]air use is not a defense to
trafficking in products used to circumvent effective technological mea-
sures that prevent unauthorized access to, or unauthorized copying
of, a copyrighted work under sections 1201(a) or (b), respectively."73
According to Patel, fair use comes into play when an individual cir-
cumvents those technologies covered by 1201(b)-which protects "a
right of a copyright owner," or, in shorthand, "copying"-because
"prohibition on individual circumvention conduct only applies with
respect to access protection technologies ... not to technologies that
prevent copying." 74 This is why Congress intentionally banned only
the individual act of circumvention in the context of § 1201(a)'s
access control provisions, and not in the context of the copying con-
trol provisions. Basically, Patel is saying that Congress has already
worked fair use into the words of the statute, and so fair use cannot
otherwise serve as a defense to DMCA liability, which contradicts her
earlier perspective explained in the preceding paragraph.




71 Id. (emphasis added).
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 Id. at 942 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
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Furthermore, Patel notes that the DMCA enumerates specific fair
use exceptions, and Real's contention that a consumer has a right to
make a personal copy of a DVD is not one of them. "[T] he DMCA's
,user exemption' is only for the individual who has gained authorized
access and who may circumvent the protection measures pursuant to
lawful conduct .... -75 Patel stresses that it is the technology itself at
issue, citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes76 for the proposition
that "[t]he fact that Congress elected to leave technologically unso-
phisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copy-
righted works without the technical means of doing so is a matter for
Congress. 77
But then, in the midst of this reasoning, Patel hints, contradicto-
rily, at the notion that fair use does play a role in determining which
circumvention tools are unlawful under the DMCA. She states,
"[F] ederal law has nonetheless made it illegal to manufacture or traf-
fic in a device or tool that permits a consumer to make . . . copies [of a
DVD]. Importantly, such tools are unable to distinguish between per-
sonal use copies of personally-owned DVDs and other sorts of copies
for other purposes ...."78 What if a circumvention tool was able to
distinguish? What if a tool could only be used to circumvent for pur-
poses of fair use? What if a tool could mostly be used to circumvent for
purposes of fair use? What if only ten percent of a tool's overall uses
could constitute an infringing use? Five percent? One percent?
It's the Sony question all over again-when is a manufacturer lia-
ble for distributing products that could be used for both infringing
and non-infringing purposes? But this time, the relevant statute is the
DMCA, not the Copyright Act. In RealNetworks, Judge Patel slightly
wavered in answering this question, though she did provide an
answer, which, in my opinion, was not entirely correct.
III. Two REGIMES
A. Reimerdes/Corley
The story of Reimerdes begins with a fifteen-year-old Norwegian
boy named Jon Johansen and the two associates whom he met over
the Internet.7 9 The trio reverse engineered a DVD player, breaking
75 Id.
76 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
77 Realnetworks, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 943 (quoting Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at
324).
78 Id. at 942-43.
79 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
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Hollywood's CSS encryption algorithm and security keys.80 Using this
information, they created DeCSS, a program capable of "ripping"
DVDs to computer hard drives.8 ' "The quality of [the] motion pic-
ture[ ] decrypted by DeCSS [was] virtually identical to that of [an]
encrypted movie[ ] on [a] DVD."8 2 Johansen then posted the pro-
gram on his personal website.8 3 Consequently, months later, Norwe-
gian prosecutors filed charges against the fifteen-year-old; however,
Johansen and his associates were only the beginning of Hollywood's
problems.8 4 DeCSS soon became widely available over the internet as
hundreds of web sites, including those of the defendant Eric Corley
and two others, posted the program for download.8 5 In response to
the defendants' refusal to cease and desist, the Studios filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, asking the
court to enjoin the defendants from posting DeCSS or providing links
to other sites that post the program.86 The court, after trial, granted
the Studios' motion for a preliminary injunction. 7 On appeal, the
Second Circuit faced many arguments proffered by Corley and his
company, 2600 Enterprises, Inc., which invoked issues concerning the
First Amendment, the interpretation and constitutionality of the
DMCA, and the validity of the preliminary injunction.8 8 In affirming
the lower court's judgment, the Second Circuit gave credence to Dis-
trict CourtJudge Kaplan's reasoning, which presented an answer that
represents one side of the debate in regards to the question of
whether a manufacturer is liable for trafficking in products that could
be used for both infringing and noninfringing purposes under the
DMCA.
In defense of their position, the defendants ("Corley") argued
that fair use limits the Studios' rights as copyright holders of motion
pictures, and that the DMCA cannot be construed in a way that would
make it "difficult or impossible" for users to engage in such fair use.
8 9
Thus, the argument goes, the DMCA cannot reach Corley's activities,
which provide users the means to access DeCSS so that they can make
backup copies of their own DVDs-a fair use right retained by the
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 308.
83 Id. at 311.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 311-12.
86 Id. at 303, 312.
87 Id. at 343.
88 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001).
89 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
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public.90 In response, Judge Kaplan admitted that "[a]ccess control
measures such as CSS do involve some risk of preventing lawful as well
as unlawful uses of copyrighted material," but stated that "Congress,
however, clearly faced up to and dealt with this question in enacting
the DMCA."9 1 Kaplan began his analysis by distinguishing liability
under copyright infringement from liability under the antitrafficking
provisions of the DMCA, stating that although § 107 of the Copyright
Act allows for noninfringing fair use of copyrighted materials, the
defendants here are being sued for violating § 1201 (a) (2) of the
DMCA, which does not involve violation of copyright, but violation of
trafficking in certain kinds of products.9 2 Coldly put, "[i]f Congress
had meant the fair use defense to apply to such actions, it would have
said so."'93
In defending his position, Kaplan first noted that Congress paid
close attention to this question in passing the statute and struck a bal-
ance among the competing interests.94 This balance, in his view, was
embodied in the following decisions: (1) the limiting of
§ 1201 (a) (1)'s prohibition of the act of circumvention for purposes of
unauthorized access, not copying;95 (2) the delaying of the effective
date of § 1201 (a) (1)'s prohibition for two years "pending further
investigation about how best to reconcile Section 1201 (a) (1) with fair
use concerns";96 and (3) the enumeration of fair use exceptions in the
statute itself.9 7 In rightly dismissing Corley's invocation of Sony's doc-
trine of substantial noninfringing uses (because § 1201 of the DMCA
is the statute at issue, not the Copyright Act), Kaplan characterized
the DMCA as "fundamentally alter[ing] the landscape" of copyright law by
prohibiting circumvention technology.
9 8
Thus, according to his reasoning, although Corley would not be
liable for contributory infringement under the Sony doctrine (which
construes the Copyright Act), he would be liable under § 1201 of the
DMCA.9 9 In reiterating that fair use is not a defense to liability under






95 This reasoning mirrors that of Judge Patel's. See supra Part II.D.
96 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
97 Id.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 See id.
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so far as the applicability of the fair use defense to Section 1201 (a)
claims is concerned, is crystal clear. . . . The fact that Congress
elected to leave technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to
make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the technical
means of doing so is a matter for Congress unless Congress' deci-
sion contravenes the Constitution .... ioo
In affirming the judgment, the Second Circuit added very little to
Kaplan's discussion, dismissing Corley's fair use arguments as being
"far beyond the scope of this lawsuit for several reasons."1 0 1 These
reasons consisted of the following: (1) Corley did not "claim to be
making fair use of any copyrighted materials, and nothing in the
injunction prohibits them from making such fair use. They are
barred from trafficking in a decryption code that enables unautho-
rized access to copyrighted materials"; (2) the evidence Corley
presented concerning the impact that the DMCA has on the public's
fair use rights is "scanty and fails adequately to address the issues"; and
(3) Corley has not shown that the public, constitutionally, has a fair
use right to use copyrighted material in its original or preferred for-
mat.10 2 By punting on the issue and upholding Judge Kaplan's opin-
ion, the Second Circuit gave credence to Kaplan's line of reasoning.
Consequently, many courts have followed the Reimerdes opinion.
One example is the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California in 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc.,1 03 which
held that the DMCA did not "impermissibly" burden fair use rights
because fair use is still possible as users can still copy DVDs using non-
digital means, though "such copying will not be as easy, as exact, or as
digitally manipulable as [the] plaintiff desires. °1 0 4 However, 321 Stu-
dios concerned the question of whether the DMCA violates the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause. 0 5 Nevertheless, in regards to
the interpretation of the DMCA itself, the court in 321 Studios, as well
as other courts, agreed with Corley in holding that the "legal down-
stream use of the copyrighted material by customers is not a defense
to the software manufacturer's violation of the provisions of
§ 1201 (b) (1)."106
100 Id. at 324.
101 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001).
102 Id. at 459.
103 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
104 Id. at 1101-02.
105 Id. at 1101-05.
106 Id. at 1097-98; see also United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1124
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (-The statute does not distinguish between devices based on the uses
to which the device will be put. Instead, all tools that enable circumvention of use
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B. Chamberlain Group
In contrast to Reimerdes's strict, bright-line interpretation, the
Federal Circuit's approach, articulated in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc.,10 7 respects the public's right to fairly use
copyrighted content when that right is thrown up against the
DMCA.1 08 The issue before the Federal Circuit concerned Chamber-
lain's claim that the defendant Skylink had violated the antitrafficking
clause by creating and distributing technology that bypassed security
measures embedded in Chamberlain's garage door openers
(GDOs). 109 Chamberlain, a garage door manufacturer, sold a prod-
uct known as Security+, which incorporated a copyrighted "rolling
code" computer program into its GDO, which constantly changed the
transmitter signal that opened its garage doors. 10 Skylink, a company
operating in the same line of business, sold products known as univer-
sal transmitters, which interoperated with a user's GDO system regard-
less of make or model.111 This allowed a homeowner to replace a
GDO or own a spare.112 Skylink's Model 39 transmitter, the product
at issue, interoperated with Security+ not by using "rolling code" tech-
nology, but by making "use of a 'resynchronization' loophole within
the system."1 13 Chamberlain filed suit seeking to enjoin Model 39
from the market. The complaint did not allege direct or contributory
copyright infringement, but alleged that "because [Chamberlain's]
opener and transmitter both incorporate computer programs 'pro-
tected by copyright' and because rolling codes are a 'technological
measure' that 'controls access' to those programs, Skylink is prima
facie liable for violating § 1201 (a) (2)."114
restrictions are banned, not merely those use restrictions that prohibit
infringement.").
107 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
108 See id. at 1204.




113 Tate Michael Keenan, A Key to Unlocking Your iPhone: Eliminating Wireless Service
Providers' Use of United States Copyright Law to Limit Consumer Choice and Provider Competi-
tion, 43 GA. L. REv. 229, 247 (2008). The Model 39 transmits three fixed codes in
rapid succession. See Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1185. "The combination of these
three codes transmitted with every press of the Model 39 transmitter button will either
cause the Chamberlain GDO to operate in response to the first fixed code or cause
the GDO to resynchronize and operate in response to the second and third fixed
codes." Id.
114 Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1185.
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The Federal Circuit characterized its job as one of statutory con-
struction, ajob which initially entailed a determination as to what the
antitrafficking provision of the DMCA prohibits.1 5 Before beginning
its analysis, the court laid down the law of statutory construction.
First, the court must look to the language at issue, and if unambigu-
ous, the court stops there.116 However, if the court cannot adequately
determine Congress's intent, the court will employ other, less satisfac-
tory means, including analysis of the statute's structure and legislative
history. 117 "Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation
of the text and structure of [a statute], except to the extent that they
may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead
to a result so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it."118
At the start of its analysis, the Federal Circuit emphasized a "cru-
cial" distinction between causes of action and property rights.119 The
DMCA's anticircumvention provisions did not establish new property
rights, but did establish causes of action under which a defendant may
be liable.1 20 This distinction, the court says, "goes straight to the issue
of authorization." 121 Under copyright law, a plaintiff need only prove
ownership of a valid copyright and copying of original elements of
that work-whether the defendant has the right to copy the work
serves as an affirmative defense, meaning the burden is placed on the
defendant to show "authorization" in the form of a license or a fair
use right.1 22 But under the DMCA, circumvention of a technological
measure is defined as "impair[ing] a technological measure ... with-
out the authority of the copyright owner." 123 Thus, in order to prove
circumvention, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's access
was unauthorized.1 24 In Chamberlain's case, this is "a significant bur-
den... as... the copyright laws authorize consumers to use the copy
of Chamberlain's software embedded in the GDOs that they
purchased."' 25
115 Id. at 1191.
116 Id. at 1192 ("[W]e must enforce the congressional intent embodied in that
plain wording.").
117 Id.
118 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511
U.S. 164, 188 (1994)).
119 Id. at 1191.
120 Id. at 1192-93.
121 Id. at 1193.
122 Id.
123 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (3) (A) (2006) (emphasis added); see supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
124 Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1193.
125 Id.
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However, under the Reimerdes/ Corley regime, the legality of using
a copy of Chamberlain's software would ostensibly not matter because
fair use does not serve as a defense to the antitrafficking provisions of
the DMCA. Under Judge Kaplan's analysis, the fundamental land-
scape of copyright law was altered-technology that circumvents a
technological measure is prohibited, even if that prohibition inhibits
the public's fair use rights. However, Chamberlain states that "the
DMCA emphatically did not 'fundamentally alter' the legal landscape
governing the reasonable expectations of consumers or competitors;
did not 'fundamentally alter' the ways that courts analyze industry
practices; and did not render the pre-DMCA history of the GDO indus-
try irrelevant."126 The Chamberlain Group asserted that even if con-
sumers had a right to use the software embedded in the GDOs before
the enactment of the DMCA, that right must now be measured in light
of the DMCA, which outlaws "all... uses of products containing copy-
righted software to which a technological measure control[s] access"
under § 1201 (a) (1) unless explicit authorization is given. 127 In
response, the Federal Circuit again stressed that the DMCA did not
create new property rights, and so Chamberlain's claim must fail. 12
8
After establishing that consumers still have a right to use the
software contained in a purchased GDO, the Court moved to the rele-
vant question: whether, despite the effect on consumer rights, the
antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA prohibit the manufacture and
distribution of a product that bypasses the security system placed
within a GDO. In interpreting the DMCA, the court looked to both
language and structure, holding that it is "clear that § 1201 applies
only to circumventions reasonably related to protected rights."129 Thus,
companies that traffic in devices that bypass technological measures
placed within copyrighted materials do not violate the antitrafficking
provisions unless the devices facilitate copyright infringement. 130 The
legislative history supports this conclusion because the principle
126 Id. at 1194.
127 Id. at 1193.
128 Chamberlain asserted that "the DMCA overrode all pre-existing consumer
expectations about the legitimate uses of products containing copyrighted embedded
software" and "that Congress empowered manufacturers to prohibit consumers from
using embedded software products in conjunction with competing products when it
passed § 1201(a)(1)." Id. at 1193.
129 Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
130 See id. at 1195-96.
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theme contained in the legislative history is the balancing of compet-
ing interests between copyright owners and users.131
Chamberlain Group's main argument, of course, drew support
from the Reimerdes opinion. But the court was quick to distinguish its
facts from that case. 132 The product in Reimerdes enabled users to ille-
gally reproduce copyrighted DVDs, while Skylink's accused product
enables "only legitimate uses of copyrighted software." 133 Stating that
"[i] t is unlikely... that the Second Circuit meant to imply anything as
drastic as wresting the concept of 'access' from its context within the
Copyright Act," the court noted that divorcing illegal circumvention
from copyright infringement would create two distinct copyright
regimes.134 In the first regime, a copyright owner possesses only those
rights granted by the Copyright Act.' 3 5 In the second regime, "the
owners of a work protected by both copyright and a technological mea-
sure .. .would possess unlimited rights to hold circumventors liable
under § 1201 (a) merely for accessing that work, even if that access ena-
bled only rights that the Copyright Act grants to the public."' 36
Surely, Congress could not have intended this result. First, courts
substantially defer to Congress in deciding how best to serve the goals
of the Intellectual Property Clause; however, "Congress' exercise of its
... authority must be rational." 13 7 Allowing copyright owners to con-
trol all access to works merely by placing within that work a technolog-
ical measure borders on the irrational. I38 Second, in construing a
statute, any potential interpretation of a provision that would result in
a contradiction of another provision in the same statute must be
wrong. Chamberlain Group's proposed interpretation would flatly
contradict § 1201 (c) (1) of the DMCA, which clearly states that rights
and limitations to copyright infringement, which includes fair use,
shall not be affected. Third, the policy implication resulting from
such interpretation is "absurd" and "disastrous."'139
Thus, Chamberlain sets out a different interpretation of the
anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, which predicates liability
131 Id. at 1196; see H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998) (stating that the
anticircumvention provisions "fully respect[ ] and extend[ ] into the digital environ-
ment the bedrock principle of 'balance' in American intellectual property law for the
benefit of both copyright owners and users").
132 Chamberlain Group, 381 F.3d at 1197-98.
133 Id. at 1198.
134 Id. at 1199.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1200.
137 Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 n.10 (2003)).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1201.
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on "a reasonable relationship between the circumvention at issue and
a use relating to a property right for which the Copyright Act permits
the copyright owner to withhold authorization. 1 40 Although the Fed-
eral Circuit purported to side with the Reimerdes! Corley regime, the
language of the two cases cannot be reconciled. Reimerdes! Corley
stated that fair use is not a defense to the anticircumvention provi-
sions of the DMCA because the question of whether there is a viola-
tion does not revolve around copyright infringement, but revolves
around whether there was a violation of the antitrafficking provisions.
Chamberlain, on the other hand, demands a showing of infringement
with circumvention before one is held liable.
It is possible to read Reimerdes/ Corley as holding that fair use is
not a defense to the DMCA when a product enables a user to infringe.
Put differently, if a product enables a user to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure and allows that user to infringe, fair use cannot serve as a
defense even if that same product also allows the user to circumvent
for noninfringing purposes. This interpretation might accommodate
the Chamberlain holding-that liability under the DMCA will not
derive from a product that only enables users to engage in noninfring-
ing uses. But what if a product is used to circumvent for purposes of
noninfringing use 99.9% of the time, and 0.1% of the time the prod-
uct is used to infringe? What if the ratio is 90% to 10%?
If Chamberlain and Reimerdes! Corley are interpreted to coexist,
then Real would not violate the anticircumvention provisions if its
product only enabled users to engage in noninfringing activity; for
instance, if it only allowed users to make a backup copy or create a
digital library of the users' purchased DVDs.141 Yet, if Chamberlain and
Reimerdes/ Corley do not coexist, then a conflict exists between the cir-
cuits, prompting the question: which circuit is correct? Finally, an
issue arises when one considers that users can always use technology
in a creative and novel way. If a product does enable infringing use in
limited circumstances, should those limiting circumstances take the
product, which otherwise enables users to engage in noninfringing
activity, outside the protection of Chamberlain? Before answering
these questions, it is necessary to discuss how the Supreme Court
answered similar questions that arose under the Copyright Act of
1976.
140 Id. at 1204.
141 This argument assumes that the act of backing up a DVD is an exercise of an
individual's fair use right.
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IV. THE SONY DOCTRINE
Evidenced by the twenty-five amici filed alongside the parties'
briefs to the Supreme Court, Sony was a case that had the potential to
greatly and immediately impact commerce-an impact on, specifi-
cally, the law enforcement policy of consumers' use of home record-
ing technology. 142 The Sony case arose in an era quite different from
the digital era of RealNetworks, however, both cases concern the advent
of new technology and its effect on copyright.1 43 The new technology
in the 1970s was Sony's Betamax video tape recorder (VTR). The
VTR allowed consumers to record television programming onto mag-
netic tapes and to simultaneously view one show while taping
another.144 Misjudging what Universal's response would be to the
VTR, Sony's advertising firm asked for Universal's permission to refer-
ence some of Universal's copyrighted content in its advertisements for
the Betamax device. 145 Universal responded by demanding that the
device be taken off the market. After Sony declined, Universal and
Disney sued, alleging that certain individuals had infringed its copy-
right by using VTR to record its copyrighted works. 146 Plaintiffs sued
Sony for marketing the VTRs to these infringing consumers on a the-
ory of contributory infringement, though they declined to sue any
individual consumer. 147 Sony's advertising agency had assumed that
Universal would welcome the VTR because it would increase con-
sumer viewing of their television shows. Instead, Universal saw the
VTR as a threat to its "still nascent[ ] investment in videodisc technol-
ogy."1 48 This new technology venture of Universal "promised to cre-
ate a market for pre-recorded video content... [but] would not have
recording capability."']49
After the reversal of the federal district court's decision by the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
answer the question of "whether the sale of [Sony's] copying equip-
ment to the general public violates any of the rights conferred upon
142 Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 956
(2007).
143 See id. at 945.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
147 Id.
148 Menell & Nimmer, supra note 142, at 945. Disney, the other complainant, saw
VTR technology as a threat to the generational redistribution of its timeless Disney
classics and its other film rental business. See id. at 946.
149 Id. at 945.
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[Universal and Disney] by the Copyright Act."150 In answering this
question, the Court supplied an old framework to a novel context,
taking the patent law's "staple article of commerce" inquiry of substan-
tial noninfringing uses and applying it to the Copyright Act.151
The Court began its reasoning with an explication of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause and the judiciary's historic reluctance in
expanding copyright without explicit action by the legislature-the
body of government that is both constitutionally charged with and
most institutionally capable of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts." 152 When ambiguity exists in copyright law, the Court
stated that it must be guided by "the ultimate aim [which] is . . . to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. '153 This stimu-
lation comes from the incentives given to creators. But these incen-
tives "must ultimately s erve the cause of promoting broad public availability
of literature, music, and the other arts."154 The Court then noted that
§ 106 of the Copyright Act-which grants copyright owners certain
exclusive rights, including the right to use and authorize reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works-does not give to the copyright owner
unqualified rights.155 "All reproductions.., are not within the exclu-
sive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain.
Any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the
copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use."156
Although the Copyright Act does not by its words render liable
one who contributes to or induces infringement, the Patent Act holds
that "[w] hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be lia-
ble as an infringer."' 5 7 Vicarious and contributory liability are preva-
lent throughout the law, and so should also be applied to copyright
infringement. 5 8 Vicarious liability concerns the relationship between
the potentially vicariously liable party and the direct infringer, and
rests on an analysis of whether the potentially vicariously liable party
has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and a
150 Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
151 Id. at 441-42.
152 Id. at 428 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). "Congress has the constitu-
tional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permuta-
tions of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by... new technology." Id.
at 431.
153 Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
154 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156).
155 Id. at 432-33; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
156 Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added).
157 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006).
158 Sony, 464 U.S. at 435.
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direct financial interest in the infringing activity. Contributory
infringement rests on knowledge of and a material contribution to the
infringing activity. Sony does not have the right and ability to super-
vise those who infringe using Betamax, and so vicarious liability would
not apply. Thus, the imposition of secondary liability in this case
rested on a theory of contributory infringement.159
In defining contributory infringement, the Patent Act expressly
holds that:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manu-
facture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 160
Congress, in enacting this provision, made the public interest in acces-
sing and using a particular article a relevant consideration in deciding
whether that article should be enjoined from the market for its ability
to be and proclivity in being used for infringing purposes.' 6' Further-
more, when contributory negligence is found, the sale of the article
that enables direct infringement under the Patent Act comes under
the control of the patent owner-it can be said that "the disputed
article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee." 62 Lastly, the
Court has always recognized in contributory infringement cases the
importance of not allowing a patent owner to extend his monopoly to
such an extent that would upset the balance created by Congress and
the constitutional public policy that must ultimately be served.' 63
Although there are "substantial" differences between patent and
copyright, there is a "historic kinship" between these two areas of
law.' 64 In regards to contributory infringement specifically, both
areas of law ground the doctrine of contributory infringement on the
159 See id. at 439 ("If vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must
rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that
its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious
liability on such a theory.").
160 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (emphasis added).
161 Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
162 Id. at 441.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 439; see Menell & Nimmer, supra note 142, at 984-85 (testing whether
there was an historic kinship between patent and copyright law).
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recognition that at times others must be held liable for making
infringement possible.1 65 The "staple article of commerce" doctrine
expressly strikes the balance to be had in these situations in the con-
text of patent infringement, and so the Court imputed this doctrine to
the Copyright Act, stating that "the sale of copying equipment, like
the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjec-
tionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses." 166
Despite this language, whether a product needs to be merely
capable of substantial noninfringing use or whether there must exist
actual substantial noninfringing use by the public is a question that
has no precise answer. 16 7 However, the origins and policy behind the
doctrine are clear. But recall, Congress is the branch constitutionally
and most capably charged with striking the balance, and so whether
Sony (or something like it) survived the DMCA is a question of statu-
tory interpretation. The Court in Sony was faced with an ambiguity of
the Copyright Act, and so it applied a doctrine for which Congress
had expressly provided in the Patent Act. Similarly, if an ambiguity
exists in the DMCA, a court should rule in a way that effectuates how
Congress would have set the balance if it had expressly done so. In
making this ruling, courts must look to both how Congress has acted
in the past-even if those actions involved different, yet sufficiently
similar contexts-and to whether a ruling would create incentives that
stimulate artistic incentives which "ultimately serve the cause of pro-
moting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts."' 6
8
V. REALNETWORKS AND A DOCTRINE OF NONSUBSTANTIAL
INFRINGING USES
Although Judge Patel's opinion in RealNetworks is contradictory at
times, her holding is clearly stated: fair use is not a defense to traffick-
165 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
166 Id.
167 Everyone thought that the Court would answer this question in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), however, the Court left the
issue unresolved in overruling the Ninth Circuit's misapplication of Sony, which
"limit[ed] secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to which the case
applied." Id. at 933. Grokster applied the Patent Act's "inducement rule" to copyright
law in holding that Grokster's actions fell outside Sony's safe harbor due to the com-
pany's unlawful intent. See id.
168 Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932)).
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ing in products that circumvent technological measures under the
antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA. It is the technology itself at
issue, not copyright infringement. According to Patel, fair use comes
into play when an individual circumvents for "copying" (not access)
purposes, as Congress specifically left out this prohibition in order to
protect fair use. But then Patel quotes Reimerdes for the proposition
that "[t]he fact that Congress elected to leave technologically unso-
phisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copy-
righted works without the technical means of doing so is a matter for
Congress. 1 6 9 This makes no sense. Recall, interpretations that lead
to contradictions within a statute must be wrong. Congress would not
specifically craft the DMCA in a way that would protect the public's
fair use right, and then, at the same time, enact a provision that would
in effect destroy the public's fair use right.170 In other words, if "Con-
gress elected to leave technologically unsophisticated persons who
wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the
technical means of doing so," then why would it demonstrate its com-
mitment to fair use by purposely leaving out a prohibition on the indi-
vidual act of circumventing a technological measure for purposes of
fair use copying? Either Congress did not care about fair use when
crafting the DMCA or the interpretation which leads to that conclu-
sion is wrong.
Furthermore, Patel's holding that fair use is not a defense to traf-
ficking in products that circumvent technological measures that pro-
tect against "copying" makes no sense in itself because a
"technological measure" as defined in § 1201 (b) is a measure that "in
the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise
limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title.11 71
This means that whether a "technological measure" exists depends on
whether a consumer is using the copyrighted material illegally, as the
definition hinges on the existence of a copyright owner's right. It must
169 RealNetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 943 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
170 Not only would the antitrafficking provisions, as interpreted by Judge Patel,
have the effect of destroying the public's fair use right (because the public would not
have the technical means to exercise its fight), but § 1201 (a) (1) (A)'s circumvention
prohibition concerning access would do the same. Copyright owners can combine
access and copying measures in the same protection system, "making it impossible to
circumvent copy-controls (which is not prohibited) without circumventing access-con-
trols (which is prohibited)." Circumventing Copyright Controls, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PRO-
jEcr, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/circumventing-copyright-controls (last
updated May 9, 2008).
171 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2) (B) (2006) (emphasis added).
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be, then, that CSS protection is a "technological measure" under the
DMCA when a consumer bums a copy of a DVD that he does not own,
but is not a "technological measure" under the DMCA when that same
consumer burns a copy of a DVD that he legally purchased. This must
be true because in the latter situation the copyright owner's rights are
not being prevented, restricted, or otherwise limited because the cop-
yright owner possesses no rights against actions that are an exercise of
rights retained by the public under fair use. This leads to the ines-
capable conclusion that whether a device, such as CSS, is a "techno-
logical measure" under the copying provisions of the DMCA depends
entirely on how a circumvention product, like RealDVD, is being
used.
For these reasons, implicit in the analysis of whether the antitraf-
ficking provisions of the DMCA have been violated, at least in the con-
text of "copying," is an inquiry into fair use. Judge Kaplan's statement
in Reimerdes, that "[i]f Congress had meant the fair use defense to
apply to such actions, it would have said so,11172 overlooks the fact that
Congress did say so-the DMCA's definition of a "technological mea-
sure" evidences Congress's will to consider fair use in § 1201 (b) "copy-
ing" inquiries. Furthermore, the antitrafficking provision of
§ 1201 (a) (2), which deals with access, should not apply to a consumer
who legally buys a DVD because that consumer has the authority to
use the purchased DVD in legal ways, which include all of the ways
allowed by fair use. Chamberlain's interpretation predicating liability
on "a reasonable relationship between... circumvention.., and a...
property right" is the more persuasive interpretation. Surely, Con-
gress did not mean to divorce liability for circumvention from
infringement (which implicates a fair use analysis) because as Cham-
berlain explained, this would create two distinct regimes of copyright
law.
However, Chamberlain alone is an inadequate source. Under the
facts of that case, Skylink's Model 39 transmitter could only be used in
non-infringing ways. Chamberlain was easy. RealNetworks, as presented
to Judge Patel, was a little less easy. Although RealDVD can be used
for substantial non-infringing purposes (satisfying the Sony doctrine),
the product can also be used for substantial infringing purposes
because it does not limit the number of times a physical DVD can be
copied and allows a user to copy DVDs not owned by its user.
Though her reasoning seems confused, Judge Patel did the right
thing. RealDVD, as currently constructed, should be enjoined from
the market because it allows consumers to circumvent technological
172 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
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measures that protect the rights of copyright owners, which violates
the DMCA. The question remains, though. What if RealDVD was re-
engineered in a way that drastically limited the ways in which it could
be used for infringing purposes? What if RealDVD, which allows for
substantial noninfringing uses, could be re-engineered in a way that
would also allow for nonsubstantial infringing uses? That circum-
stance presents a much more difficult case. The Sony doctrine is inap-
plicable to this question because the anticircumvention provisions of
the DMCA were clearly enacted by Congress to prevent widespread
infringement through use of products that circumvent technological
measures. Application of Sony would defeat this purpose. But if a
product can merely be used for nonsubstantial infringing uses, the
product should not be banned per se from the market, especially when
the product gives to the public a means to enjoy the rights that come
with living in a free and open society. Though specific suggestions on
how to deal with this problem are the subject of a different note, my
purpose here is only to elucidate an issue which will fester until it
consumes the attention of the intellectual property world. For we are
only in the beginning stages of the digital age, and as technology
advances, so will the ability to place limiting restrictions on products
such as RealDVD.
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